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INTRODUCTION 
Collective bargaining has remained within the realm of the nation 
state even more than most other areas of industrial relations. These 
national bargaining systems still vary considerably in their institutions and 
practices across the EU member states. At the same time, economic 
integration has made substantial progress in particul r due to the single 
market and European Monetary Union (EMU), which have created strictly 
supranational markets within the EU. This coincidence of deepening 
economic integration and persisting national hegemony over collective 
bargaining has given rise to concerns in two respects. 
First, there is the question of how economic integration will affect 
collective bargaining. Regardless of their manifold differences in institutions 
and practices, the national bargaining systems under the umbrella of the 
EU share one essential property in that they are more ‘organized’ than their 
counterparts are in most other (namely non-European) OECD countries: 
this is manifested in the predominance of multi-e ployer bargaining, 
covering the vast majority of employees (Traxler et al., 2001). In this 
respect, one may well speak of a EU model of bargaining. The notable 
exception to this model is the United Kingdom, where single-employer 
bargaining supplanted multi-employer settlements already in the 1980s, 
resulting in a decline in collective bargaining coverage from about 70 per 
cent in the early 1980s to little more than 20 per cent in the mid-1990s. 
Furthermore, the reform countries of Central and Eastern Europe are also 
characterized by rather unorganized bargaining systems. Against this 
background, three scenarios of the future of bargaining have been 
discussed. The pessimistic scenario assumes that EMU will prompt a 
general process of disorganization, as Europe’s supranational markets will 
tend to undermine bargaining system  the scope of which is still limited to 
the nation state (e.g. Mahnkopf and Altvater, 1995). Such prospects of 
disorganization may have even been one important goal of the neoliberal 
policy community, when advocating EMU (Crouch, 2000; Dølvik, 1999). 
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Under these circumstances, Europeanization would occur in a very 
restricted way, giving rise to highly fragmented, company-based practices 
of transnational bargaining. These practices are supposed to develop at the 
expense of the national level, since the Eurocompanies when adopting 
these practices will tend to opt out of the national bargaining structures 
(Visser and Ebbinghaus, 1992). The optimistic scenario suggests that 
economic integration may spill over to industrial relations, leading to a 
multi-level bargaining system that includes European level collective 
agreements (e.g. Jacobi, 1998). While both the pessimistic and optimistic 
scenario imply significant changes in the bargaining system, a third line of 
reasoning stresses the continuity and path depenncy of industrial 
relations developments (Ferner and Hyman, 1998a, Traxler et al., 2001). 
The key argument underlying this position is that economic pressures affect 
industrial relations only indirectly, in that these pressures are processed 
and filtered by the established institutions. Notably, this does not rule out 
the possibility of growing divergence in terms of substantive bargaining 
outcomes within the national systems (Marginson and Sisson, 1998), 
provided that flexibility rather than rigidity is the institutional code that 
guides the system’s response to the economic challenge. At any rate, the 
path dependency means that the national bargaining systems will not easily 
change even under the aegis of EMU, and Europeanization of bargaining 
can take place only in a way which is compatible with the given institutional 
diversity of bargaining across the EU (Traxler, 2002b). 
The second concern refers to the macroeconomic performance of 
collective bargaining under EMU. It is widely assumed that EMU places the 
main burden on the labor market, when it comes to adjusting to 
asymmetrical shocks (i.e. economic imbalances within the eurozone). This 
is because EMU deprives the eurozone countries of the exchange rate as a 
means of compensating for imbalances. Since transnational labor mobility 
is low in Europe, collective bargaining, namely bargaining over wages 
becomes the key parameter of labor market adjustments. As is in the case 
of the future development of bargaining, so the problem with performance 
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ensues from the coincidence of economic integration and national 
fragmentation of bargaining. Again, one can differentiate between three 
scenarios. The first one contends that this coincidence will provoke 
inflationary wage policies (e.g. Soskice and Iversen, 1998). As a 
consequence of national fragmentation, each single bargaining unit is too 
small to have a noticeable impact on macroeconomic development in the 
eurozone. Hence, there is no incentive to moderate wages for the sake of 
price stability and employment. The counterposition is that there is a 
deflationary risk in that the distinct nationally differentiated bargaining units 
embark on competitive wage policies aimed at lowering the labor costs of 
one’s own country in relation to the country’s trading partners (Busch, 
1992). Finally, the national fragmentation of bargaining is supposed to 
reinforce economic imbalances in the eurozone, since the national 
bargaining systems strongly differ in their ability to align their wage policy 
with macroeconomic requirements (Traxler, 1999b). 
This paper will address the development and performance of 
bargaining under EMU in line with the following methodological 
considerations: scholarly debates on the development and performance of 
institutions tend to treat these questions as one and the same problem. The 
assumption underlying such reasoning is that institutional change is driven 
by performance pressures bringing about a natural selection that enables 
only well performing institutions to survive. However, there is the possibility 
that inefficient institutions can survive due to market imperfections that fail 
to enforce efficiency (North, 1990). Furthermore, functionally equivalent 
institutional arrangements may exist, such that institutional diversity across 
Europe may last even when EMU magnifies the scale of performance 
pressures. At any rate, it is reasonable to consider the development and 
performance of bargaining as distinct questions. 
A second methodological problem is that a sound empirical basis 
for predicting the development and performance of bargaining under EMU 
is lacking, since the pre-EMU phase (beginning with the Maastricht treaty) 
and EMU as such have covered a rather short time period. Hence, we 
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adopt a long-term perspective on these issues, including 1970 to 1996 for 
15 European countries (Table 1). As regards developments, this enables 
analysis to examine how the national bargaining systems responded to 
essential changes in the economic policy regime which are comparable to 
the establishment of EMU: this refe s to the shift from Keynesian to 
neoliberal policies in the late 1970s/early 1980s, and the preparation and 
implementation of the single market during the second half of the 1980s. In 
the case of performance, a long-term perspective is preferable, since 
institutions can have only a structural (i.e. long-term) impact on 
performance due to their high degree of stability. 
As far as European economic integration primarily means the rise 
of a supranational market, it is almost impossible to isolate its effect from 
more encompassing processes of ‘globalization’ of markets. This is 
important since the main challenge posed by EMU to bargaining ensues 
from growing market competition. Under these circumstances, a long-term 
perspective is appropriate, because this offers the opportunity to study how 
the bargaining systems tend to respond to growing market pressures. 
For the reasons outlined above, we have to consider both the 
national and the European level, when analyzing the interplay of bargaining 
and EMU. 
Finally, we will limit our comparative analysis to those dimensions 
of collective bargaining which have most hotly been debated, as far as 
issues of development and performance are concerned: that is, 
centralization and coordination of bargaining. The degree of centralization 
refers to the level at which collective agreements are formally fixed. Given 
multi-level bargaining in all countries under consideration, country scores 
are based on a country’s most important bargaining level. Coordination of 
bargaining means that there is an economy-wide synchronization of 
bargaining. 
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Table 1 
Forms of Wage Setting in Western Europe* 
 
COORDINATION 1970–1973   
 % 
1974–1976   
 % 
1977—1979   
 % 
1980–1982   
 % 
1983–1985   
 % 
1986–1990   
 % 
1991–1993   
 % 
1994–1996   
 % 
State-sponsored 
Coordination 
 
DKx, FINx 
B, Dx, IRL 
 
38.5 
FINx, Nx, Sx 
B, Dx, I, 
IRL, UK 
57.1 
FINx, Sx 
B, E, IRL,  
UK 
40.0 
FINx, IRL 
 
 
13.3 
FINx, DKx,  
E, I, NLx,  
Sx 
40.0 
FINx,Nx, B, 
DKx, IRL, 
NLx, Sx 
46.7 
FINx, Nx, B, 
DKx, I, IRL, 
NLx, P, Sx 
60.0 
DKx, I, IRL, 
Nx, NL 
 
33.3 
Inter-associational 
Coordination 
Nx, Sx 
 
15.4 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
Sx, E 
 
13.3 
Nx 
 
6.7 
I 
 
6.7 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
Intra-associational 
Coordination 
Ax,CHx,I, 
NLx 
30.8 
Ax,CHx 
 
14.3 
Ax,CHx,I, 
NLx 
26.7 
Ax,CHx,I 
 
20.0 
CHx,IRL+,P 
 
20.0 
CHx,E,P 
 
20.0 
CHx, E 
 
13.3 
CHx, E, P 
 
20.0 
Pattern bargaining  
0.0 
 
0.0 
Dx 
6.7 
Dx, DKx, 
13.3 
Ax, Dx 
13.3 
Ax, Dx 
13.3 
Ax, Dx 
13.3 
Ax, Dx 
13.3 
State-imposed coordination F 
7.7 
DKx, F, NL, P 
28.6 
DKx, F, Nx, P 
26.7 
B,F,Nx,NLx, P 
33.3 
B, F 
13.3 
F 
6.7 
F 
6.7 
B, F 
13.3 
No coordination UK 
7.7 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
UK 
6.7 
UK+ 
6.7 
UK+ 
6.7 
UK+ 
6.7 
FINx, Sx,UK+ 
20.0 
             Total 13  100.0 14  100.0 15  100.0 15  100.0 15  100.0 15  100.0 15  100.0 15  100.0 
BCEN 5.38 5.21 5.90 5.90 6.77 6.43 6.43 7.46 
* Modal values of annual observations per period. 
Portugal since 1975, Spain since 1977. 
a DK: state-sponsored in 1997, state-imposed in 1998 
b S:    no coordination in 1997, pattern bargaining in 1998 
c N:    central-level bargaining in 1997 
Central-level bargaining put in italics. 
x High (i.e. state-licensed) bargaining governability, + predominance of single-employer bargaining. 
Country codes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, D = Germany, DK = Denmark, E = Spain, FIN = Finland, F = France, IRL = Ireland, I = 
Italy, NL = Netherlands, N = Norway, P = Portugal, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
BCEN = Degree of bargaining centralization; centralization decreases with score (For definition of BCEN, see Traxler et al. 2001). 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  
The development of collective bargaining in terms of centralization 
and coordination at the national level is summarized in Table 1. The three 
decades covered by Table 1 are differentiated into eight subperiods. 
Country scores for both variables refer to collective bargaining over wages. 
This is because centralization as well as coordination of bargaining varies 
with bargaining issues in some countries. For instance in Spain, several 
central-level accords on non-wage issues were struck during the 1990s, 
whereas the level most important to wage formation was the industry.  
As regards the centralization variable (i.e. BCEN), Table 1 shows a 
clear trend towards decentralization of bargaining. As the average score on 
BCEN for all countries under consideration indicates, that bargaining has 
significantly become decentralized from the first period to the last one 
(paired t-test; t= -2.60, p= 0.03, n= 12). On closer examination of the 
subperiods, one finds distinct movements within the general trend. During 
the first half of the 1970s (i.e. from the first to the second subperiod) 
collective bargaining experienced a process of (insignificant) centralization 
(t-test; t= -1.00, p= 0.34, n= 13). From this subperiod until 1980-82, a 
significant decline in the bargaining level took place (t-test; t= -2.05, p= 
0.06, n= 14). Further decentralization in the following subperiods occurred 
although the scale of this change in relation to 1980-82 remained 
statistically insignificant (t- est; t= -0.79, p= 0.45, n= 14). 
One should note that the scores on BCEN somewhat downplay the 
actual scale of decentralization in that they report only changes in the most 
important bargaining level. Hence, the rise of shop floor bargaining is not 
registered as long as this did not become prevalent in a country’s 
bargaining system. For the 1980s and 1990s, Table 1 does not document 
what is often called organized decentralization (Traxler, 1995). This means 
that certain bargaining issues are delegated by the higher-level bargaining 
parties to regulation at lower level within a binding framework set by the 
higher-level settlement. Since agenda-setting and control over the lower 
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level thus remains with the higher bargaining level within a framework of 
organized decentralization, even delegation processes flowing from the 
most important level to lower levels do not constitute a change in the 
prevalent (i.e. most important) level. Organized decentralization, mainly in 
the form of a delegation of issues from the industry level to the company, 
has become widespread in Europe (Ferner and Hyman, 1998a; Traxler et 
al., 2001). This happened in two waves. From the mid-1980s onwards, 
working time has become the subject of organized decentralization, while 
wages have become so since the early 1990s. Both waves were initiated 
by the employers for the sake of more flexible arrangements.  
What follows from these observations is that the bargaining level 
underwent gradual modifications rather than radical transformations in 
terms of the predominant bargaining level over the three decades. Most 
essentially, only two countries (i.e. Ireland and the UK) saw a move from 
multi- to single employer bargaining (Table 1). In the case of Ireland, this 
remained a short-term episode. In contrast to this, single employer 
bargaining consolidated in the UK which thus moved away from the 
European model. In all the other countries, multi-employer bargaining 
continued to be prevalent in the overall bargaining system. This implies that 
the long-term trend towards decentralization, as documented by the scores 
on BCEN, mainly result from a more or less lasting shift from central-l vel 
to industry-level bargaining in several countries (namely Denmark, Sweden 
and Spain).  
Given all these tendencies towards decentralization within the 
national bargaining systems, it is no surprie that European-level 
bargaining has not developed so far. Notably, there are European-level 
negotiations within the framework as introduced by the Social Protocol of 
the Maastricht treaty (Keller and Bansbach, 2001). However, these 
negotiations do not meet the properties of free collective bargaining for two 
main reasons. Within this framework, there is no possibility of advancing 
one’s interests by means of industrial conflict. Furthermore, wages are 
explicitly excluded from the range issues that can be negotiated. 
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Turning from centralization to economy-wide coordination of 
bargaining, one finds considerable variation across countries in particular in 
terms of the kind of actors involved. One can distinguish between six main 
settings, including four voluntary forms of coordination which thus take 
place within the context of free collective bargaining (Traxler et al., 2001): 
-In the case of state-sponsored coordination the state formally or 
informally joins the bargaining process as an additional party. In contrast to 
state-imposed coordination (see below), state-sponsored coordination is a 
voluntary arrangement in which the state participates without claiming an 
imperative role in the bargaining process. The other parties to this 
arrangement are the central-level peak associations of labor and/or 
business. 
-In contrast to state-sponsored coordination inter-associational 
coordination is based on bipartite accords, concluded by the peak 
associations of the two sides of industry. This kind of coordination is thus 
identical with central-level collective bargaining.  
-The peak associations also take the lead in the course of intra-
associational coordination. This means that the peak associations nternally 
synchronize the bargaining policies of their lower-level affiliates. In 
comparison to state-imposed and state-sponsored coordination, intra-
associational coordination thus combines with rather decentralized 
bargaining. This is because the collective agreements are concluded by the 
lower-level affiliates, whereas the peak associations do not enter central-
level accords. In principle, intra-associational synchronization of bargaining 
by only one of the two sides of industry may suffice to initiate coordination.  
-Pattern bargaining establishes a mode of coordination that is even 
more decentralized than intra-associational coordination. Coordination by 
pattern bargaining rests on the leading role of a certain bargaining unit or a 
cartel of contiguous bargaining units that set the pace for bargaining in the 
other segments of the economy. The constituent property of pattern setting 
is that the leading bargaining unit(s) is (are) located below peak level. This 
implies that the peak associations themselves have only a minor role in the 
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coordination process or no role at all. In countries which have a long 
tradition of pattern bargaining (i.e. Germany, Austria and Japan) the 
bargaining units representing the metal industry set the pattern. 
-State-imposed coordination does not rely on voluntary cooperation 
between the two sides of industry but is authoritatively enforced by the 
authorities. 
-Finally, collective bargaining may remain uncoordinated. 
The development of bargaining coordination is also documented in 
Table 1. Again, the focus is on wage bargaining. The most important 
observation is that coordinated wage policies clearly prevailed in Europe 
throughout the three decades, although the form of coordination varied 
across countries and over time. State-sponsored and state-imposed 
coordination record the most pronounced fluctuations. State-sponsored 
coordination peaked first during the mid-1980s, strongly declined 
afterwards, recovered in the mid-1980s, and reached unprecedented levels 
of incidence in the early 1990s. State-imposed coordination became less 
frequent after its expansion from the mid-1970s until the early 1980s. Inter-
associational coordination was never frequent and tended to lose ground 
over time. In contrast to this, the importance of pattern bargaining steadily 
increased. The incidence of intra-associational coordination was rather 
stable, whereas the composition of countries changed. Uncoordinated 
bargaining grew strongly in the last subperiod listed in Table 1. This is an 
outlier rather than a trend, as Finland and Sweden whose bargaining had 
been uncoordinated for this subperiod, returned to coordinated policies in 
the late 1990s (Traxler, 2000). The UK is the only country showing a long 
record of uncoordinated bargaining that dates back to the 1970s and even 
1960s. As noncoordination has become durable sinc the early 1980s, the 
UK deviates from the European model also in this dimension of bargaining. 
The larger changes in both centralization and coordination of 
national bargaining reflect major alterations in its economic context. 
Growing centralization as well as the expansion of state-sponsored 
coordination during the 1970s were prompted by the first oil shock of 1973, 
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resulting in a governance mode which is widely captured as corporatist 
tripartism in the literature. The following decline, expressed in both 
significant bargaining decentralization and the decay of state-sponsored 
coordination can be traced to the fact that in several countries corporatism 
failed to cope with the problems of 1973 as well as with the second oil 
shock of 1979. The rise of neoliberalism was the response to this failure. 
The shift to state-imposed coordination that paralleled and followed the 
spread of corporatism was driven by government attempts at compensating 
for the lack of effective governance within a framework of voluntary 
incomes policy. The subsequent re-appearance of state-sponsored 
coordination does not simply coincide with major steps of European 
integration. As many national case studies show (e.g. Ferner and Hyman, 
1992; 1998b; Fajertag and Pochet, 1997; 2000), this occurred as one 
constituent part of the countries’ efforts to prepare for the single market and 
EMU. It is worth noting that this development does not mean the revival of 
that kind of corporatism which was typical of the 1970s. Aside from differing 
policy goals (which will be addressed below), there is also a structural 
difference in terms of the bargaining level. As we have seen, 
decentralization of bargaining continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
such that a new, ‘leaner’ pattern of corporatism has emerged which is 
characterized by decentralized forms of economy-wide bargaining 
coordination (Traxler, 2001). 
The first signs of decentralized coordination are also observable at 
the European level. Several initiatives for transnational coordination of 
wage bargaining which mainly differ in their territorial and economic scope 
have been launched by the unions in response to EMU (Gollbach and 
Schulten, 2000; Marginson and Schulten, 1999). The most encompassing 
initiative comes from the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
which in 1999 set up a bargaining committee devised to coordinate the 
national bargaining policies. This followed the 1998 Doorn declaration of 
the union confederations of the Benelux countries and Germany to 
coordinate bargaining of their affiliates. Since industry-level bargaining 
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prevails in most EU member states, the European Industry Federations, 
grouped under the umbrella of the ETUC, are also expected to coordinate 
bargaining within their domains. Among these federations, the coordinati n 
efforts of the European Metalworkers’ Federation are most advanced. 
These efforts are complemented by the initiative of Germany’s IG Metall to 
create cross-border collective bargaining networks. Each network is 
composed of representatives of the distinct IG Metall districts and the 
unions of the corresponding neighboring countries. Although wages are not 
the only issue of these coordination activities, they figure prominently in this 
process, since the main goal behind all the unions’ transnational 
coordination efforts is to prevent further downwards competition in 
collective bargaining.  
All these initiatives clash with the employers’ interest which is 
strongly opposed to any kind of bargaining or coordination at European, 
multi-employer level1. This is because the employers –due to their higher 
capacity for transnational mobility as compared to their labor market 
counterpart– can exploit the differences in national labor standards far 
more effectively by means of regime shopping. However, multinational 
companies are engaged in cross-border coordination of labor management 
in certain sectors (e.g. automotive manufacturing) characterized by highly 
homogenized (and thus comparable) production across distinct locations. 
This coordination does not explicitly relate to collective bargaining in that it 
is based on ‘coercive comparisons’ aimed at identifying best practices and 
generalizing them across all locations of the company (Marginson and 
Sisson, 2001). These activities primarily target work organization and 
working practices. For the above reasons of regime shopping, there is 
certainly no employer interest in either including pay levels in these 
activities or in embarking on any kind of direct negotiations with employee 
representatives at European level. Given the weakness of the European 
Works Councils (e.g. Hancke, 2000) and the unions’ transnational focus on 
the multi-employer level, the emergence of company-b sed, European-
level bargaining or coordination is the least probable variant of the possible 
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developments of Europeanization of collective bargaining. 
In comparison to the employers, the EU authorities have paid much 
more attention to the transnational dimension of wage bargaining. Since 
the start of stage two of EMU in 1994, the European Commission has 
issued annual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines that include 
recommendations for wage policy. Accordingly, wage policy should, inter 
alia, be in line with price stability (as targeted by the ECB), growth of labor 
productivity, and employment-creating investment (Schulten and Stueckler, 
2000). Furthermore, the 1999 Cologne European Council summit decided 
on the establishment of a macroeconomic dialogue aimed at improving the 
interaction between wage policy and monetary, and fiscal policy. In this 
respect, the explicit goal is rather modest in that it is defined as ‘to 
stimulate a fruitful dialogue between all actors concerned but not to engage 
in ex ante coordination of fiscal policy, monetary policy and wage 
settlements’ (Economic Policy Committee 1999: 5). Regardless of the 
concrete goals of the dialogue, its effectiveness in turn depends on the 
effectiveness of transnational coordination of wage bargaining. Due to the 
lack of interest of the employers the full burden of transnational wage 
coordination is placed on the unions. 
 
THE MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
Debates on the macroeconomic performance of collective 
bargaining systems refer to the systems’ capacity for internalizing negative 
wage externalities (i.e. rising inflation and unemployment as a result of 
wage increases). The key argument is that institutional differences in the 
bargaining systems constitute structural differences in the structural 
capacity for internalizing wage externalities which are manifested in (long-
term) differences in labor cost growth which in turn translate into 
corresponding performance differentials in terms of inflation and 
employment. Hence, the debate’s concern concentrates on the inflationary 
risks of wage policy and thus on ‘wage moderation’. Nevertheless, the 
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concept is also applicable to the second risk inherent in national 
fragmentation of bargaining under EMU, since a deflationary wage policy 
creates negative externalities as well. Put in general terms, the capacity for 
internalizing wage externalities means aligning wage policy with 
macroeconomic requirements in a way that avoids both inflationary and 
deflationary developments. 
The methods used for studying the structural performance of 
alternative bargaining institutions are analytical (i.e. deductive modelling) 
and empirical (i.e. econometrics). We do not discuss deductive models 
here, since they tend to abstract from essential elements of the real 
situation of bargaining2. Their relevance for empirical research primarily lies 
in the hypotheses that can be deduced from them. These hypotheses 
concentrate on centralization, and, more recently, also on coordination as 
the key determinants of the structural performance of a bargaining system. 
As far as centralization is concerned, one can differentiate between 
two main positions: While the corporatist hypothesis contends that 
performance increases with centralization (e.g. Headey, 1970), the hump-
shape hypothesis claims that extreme degrees of centralization and 
decentralization perform best (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). In comparison to 
these extremes, intermediate (i.e. industry-level and occupational) 
bargaining performs significantly worse. This is because intermediate 
bargaining can work as a cartel, enabling the bargaining parties to 
externalize the costs of a pay hike to other groups by jointly raising the 
output price. The argument is that this is impossible in the case of extreme 
degrees of centralization. The corporatist and hump-shape hypothesis 
agree on the beneficial effect of central-level bargaining. Its domain is so 
encompassing that the bargainers and their constituency themselves have 
to bear the negative consequences of pay rises. Given perfect competition 
in product markets, the same applies to fully decentralized (i.e. single-
employer) bargaining according to the hump-shape hypothesis, since any 
pay rise specific to a certain employer entails a loss of this employer’s 
competitiveness. 
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Not surprisingly, either of these competing positions has come up 
with empirical studies tha  support their reasoning (e.g. Cameron, 1984; 
Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). However, their explanatory power is strongly 
questioned by more recent studies (e.g. OECD 1994, OECD 1997, Traxler 
and Kittel, 2000; Traxler et al., 2001) which could not detect any kind of a 
robust association between bargaining centralization and macroeconomic 
performance. Above all, bargaining centralization has turned out to be a 
very poor predictor of labor cost growth. This is essential because labor 
costs are generally seen in the related debate as the causal link between 
the bargaining institutions and macroeconomic performance other than 
labor costs. If convincing evidence of a significant labor cost effect is 
lacking, then any empirical finding on a significant effect of centralization on 
such performance criteria as inflation and employment becomes 
inconclusive by standards of that causality assumption underlying both 
hypotheses. 
This lack of compelling empirical evidence can be traced to several 
conceptual weaknesses whic  are common to any reasoning regarding 
bargaining centralization as the key to explaining structural performance 
effects caused by the wage-setting institutions. The main weaknesses can 
be summarized as follows: 
-The debate does not systematically differentiate between 
centralization and coordination. As mentioned above, the premise of the 
debate is that alternative bargaining institutions differ in their ability to 
internalize wage externalities. This includes the point that bargaining units 
whose domain of activities is so encompassing that it achieves 
macroeconomic relevance are unable to externalize the costs of wage 
increases. A concept that focuses only on centralization neglects the fact 
that a situation of macroeconomic relevance also applies to bargaining 
systems composed of a larger number of formally independent bargaining 
units which coordinate their wage policy across the economy (Soskice, 
1990). Hence, what really matters with regard to macroeconomic weight of 
bargaining is coordination, while centralization is just a special 
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manifestation of coordination. Studies centering on centralization thus 
ignore the existence of decentralized forms of wage coordination. The 
magnitude of this shortcoming can be seen from the fact that in the vast 
majority of countries characterized by economy-wide wage coordination 
this coordination takes place in a non-centralized context (Table 1). 
-As an implication of the tendency to confuse centralization with 
coordination, the debate does not fully capture the scale of cooperation 
problems arising from economy-wide coordination. Mainstream reasoning 
on the structural ability to internalize wage externalities refers only to what 
may be called the horizontal problem of cooperation: that is, the 
relationship between the distinct sectoral and occupational groups of 
employers and employees. These groups are argued to cooperate or free 
ride, depending on how the domain of the bargaining units are demarcated 
(i.e. the degree of bargaining centralization). Poor performance, implying 
the ability to externalize the costs of wage increases, will occur when the 
domains of the bargaining units coincide with the scope of powerful, 
particularistic interest groups which enable these groups to take a free ride 
to the disadvantage of the other groups. This focus on horizontal 
cooperation neglects another v tical problem of cooperation. This ensues 
from the fact that the rank and file does not directly participate in collective 
bargaining but is represented by certain, nominated agents in this process. 
Manifold conflicts of interest between the rank and file and its 
representatives may emerge, such that the former’s compliance with the 
latter’s decisions cannot be taken for granted. Conventional reasoning 
suggests that central-level bargaining is capable of overcoming the 
horizontal as well as the vertical cooperation problem. While it is evident 
that central-level bargaining resolves the horizontal problem, it tends to 
aggravate the vertical problem of cooperation. The reason for this is that 
decision-making processes face increasing legitimation problems with 
growing centralization. In line with this, recent empirical research shows 
that labor costs even significantly increase with growing centralization of 
bargaining, when a supportive framework devised to overcome this vertical 
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cooperation problem is lacking (Traxler, 2001; 2002a). This evidence of a 
highly contingent effect of bargaining centralization helps understand why 
there is no robust, general effect of the bargaining level. At any rate, 
attempts at horizontal coordination –regardless of whether relying on a 
centralized or a decentralized setting– do not guarantee that the bargaining 
units’ members comply with these coordination efforts. On the contrary, any 
such effort brings about problems of vertical cooperation.  
-The focus on bargaining centralization fails to take account of the 
manifold forms of state regulation. There is evidence from other 
crossnational research that differences in how wage formation is regulated 
by the state affect performance (Traxler, 1999a). 
-The above points have another important methodological 
consequence for empirical studies in that they rule out the possibility of 
constructing one single, ordinal or parametric scale for measuring the wage 
setting institutions. The only dimension that meets this scale type is 
bargaining centralization which as such has turned out as no powerful 
predictor of performance. All the other dimensions discussed above differ 
not simply in quantitative but also in qualitative terms. These caveats 
include coordination (Traxler and Kittel, 2000). There is no theoretical 
argument that can show that decentralized coordination forms are 
more/better coordinated than centralized bargaining or vice versa. 
Therefore, any kind of one single, composite measure based on ordinal or 
parametric ranking of bargaining coordination is pointless3. Due to the 
multi-dimensionality of wage setting the scaling process must address each 
single dimension separately. 
The classification of bargaining coordination used in Table 1 
captures all the above points, as far as the problem of horizontal 
coordination is concerned. To overcome the problem of vertical 
cooperation, state regulation is essential, since employer organizations and 
unions are voluntary associations which can hardly bind their rank and file 
merely by fiat when conducting collective bargaining (Crouch, 1993; 
Golden, 1993). This difficulty with assuring compliance is evidenced by the 
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above mentioned finding that wage growth significantly increases with 
bargaining centralization, when such supportive legal framework is lacking. 
Its most important provisions are the legal enforceability (i.e. the ‘law-
making’ effect) of collective agreements and the peace obligation during 
the validity of a collective agreement (Traxler et al., 2001). For the purpose 
of a crossnational comparison, this results in a dichotomous categorization. 
A national system of wage setting is classified as being characterized by 
high bargaining governability f legal enforceability and the peace obligation 
are established. Otherwise, a country’s bargaining governability is low. 
It should be noted that this differentiation between horizontal and 
vertical coordination corresponds with the distinction between to 
qualitatively different forms of state interference in wage setting. State-
imposed and state-sponsored coordination are the two possible forms of 
substantive state regulation in that the state actively participates in the 
wage setting process and influences its outcome. Bargaining governability 
is a matter of procedural state regulation, since it forms part of the legal 
framework for bargaining.  
 
Table 2 
The General Relation Between Bargaining and Wage Performance 
 
Wage moderation 
 
  
Strong  Pattern bargaining Voluntary peak-level coordination* 
with high bargaining governability 
Medium Uncoordinated bargaining  State-imposed coordination 
 
Weak   Voluntary peak-level coordination* 
with low bargaining governability 
 Low Medium High 
 Vertical coordination 
 
* State-sponsored coordination, inter-associational coordination, intra-associational 
coordination. 
Source: Traxler et al. (2001: 247) 
 
Empirical studies which used these categorizations of bargaining 
coordination as predictors of economic performance for differing country
samples and time periods (Traxler and Kittel, 2000; Traxler et al., 2001) 
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could show that the institutional differences in bargaining coordination 
across countries indeed affect labor cost growth significantly. The 
institutional effects on inflation and unemployment echo those on labor 
costs. However, the impact on unemployment is much weaker than on 
labor costs and inflation. The main findings of these studies are 
summarized in Table 2. State-sponsored, inter-associational and intra-
associational coordination are subsumed under peak-l vel coordination in 
Table 2. This is because they are similar in terms of both their performance 
profile as well as their mode of coordination in that the peak associations 
have the key role in the coordination process in the case of all three 
categories. The most striking result is that peak-level coordination delivers 
contrasting performance, depending on whether bargaining governability is 
high or low. When embedded in a context of high governability, all forms of 
peak-level coordination perform very well. Yet in combination with low 
governability, they perform worse than any other kind of bargaining. This is 
consistent with the above-cited finding on the contingent effect of 
bargaining centralization. As any form of peak-level coordination is 
relatively centralized compared to alternative forms of bargaining, it is also 
burdened with more severe problems of compliance and legitimacy in 
relation to the rank and file. As a consequence, there is a much stronger 
need for a legal framework capable of making the rank and file comply than 
is the case of more decentralized forms of voluntary coordination. As 
regards the other forms of bargaining, pattern bargaining also records a 
high capacity for internalizing wage externalities. In comparison, state-
imposed coordination and uncoordinated bargaining achieve average labor 
cost increases, with non-coordination performing somewhat better than 
state-imposed coordination. One reason for this comparatively inferior 
performance of state-imposed coordination is that the state usually resorts 
to authoritative wage control as a means of ultima ratio in a situation of 
extremely poor performance of free collective bargaining.  
The upshot of these findings is that institutional differences in 
bargaining cause indeed significant and robust differences in 
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macroeconomic performance, in particular as far as (unit) labor costs and 
inflation are concerned. This relationship, however, is far more complex 
than orthodox reasoning suggests. It is not simply a matter of gradual 
differences in the degree of bargaining centralization. In contrast to this, 
there are qualitatively different properties of wage setting, leading to 
potential substitutes (i.e. functionally equivalent arrangements) in terms of 
effective wage moderation (i.e. pattern bargaining and the distinct forms of 
peak-level coordination backed by high governability). Conversely, one and 
the same form of (horizontal) coordination produces contrasting 
performance effects, depending on whether legal provisions for 
governability are established or not. 
EMU becomes important with regard to the performance of 
bargaining, since differences in monetary policy affect the scope for 
bargaining. A monetary policy that does not accommodate to what is seen 
as an inflationary policy makes it more difficult for the bargainers to 
externalize the costs of wage increases, as compared to an 
accommodating monetary regime. This means that a non-accommodating 
monetary policy may work as a substitute for the structural ability of the 
bargaining institutions to internalize negative externalities, when it comes to 
moderating wages. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that the 
need to enforce wage moderation by means of a tough monetary policy 
brings about real costs (e.g. rising unemployment) which an effective 
voluntary wage moderation does not create. In any case, the power of the 
monetary authorities to sanction and discipline the bargainers and their 
wage policy works as an intervening variable that modifies the above 
relationship between the bargaining institutions and economic 
performance, in a way depending on whether these authorities adopt a 
non-accommodating or an accommodating policy line. 
Aside from these general interaction effects, EMU creates a 
specific and new situation in that it tends to change the conditions for the 
national bargainers in the eurozone in two main respects. First, the ECB is 
modelled on the Bundesbank the high institutional independence of which 
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is argued to assure far more effective commitment to price stability than is 
the case of central banks which are less independent of the other political 
actors (e.g. Cukierman, 1992). This means that the bargainers of several 
countries (e.g. Italy, Spain) which had experienced a long recordof 
accommodating monetary policy will have to face a nonaccommodating 
regime under EMU. Second, and even more importantly, EMU alters the 
structure of interaction between monetary policy and wage policy. On the 
one hand, monetary policy in the eurozone canot target each single 
national bargaining system, since the ECB will orient its policy towards 
European money supply and inflation. On the other hand, the economic 
weight of each single national bargaining system –even when effectively 
coordinated across the domestic economy– does not suffice to have a 
noticeable macroeconomic impact on the eurozone as a whole. This as 
well as the European orientation of the ECB improves the opportunity of the 
national bargainers to externalize wage externalities. 
For all these reasons, the interaction between monetary policy and 
wage bargaining has attracted growing attention. While there are both 
analytical and empirical studies in this issue (Franzese, 2000), we again 
concentrate on empirical research here. Needless to say, related studies 
differ widely in how they operationalize wage bargaining and monetary 
policy. Since monetary responses to wage movements are just one certain 
kind of wage externality, it is reasonable to disregard work on centralization 
and follow the above categorization of bargaining coordination instead, 
when conceptualizing the institutional setting of wage policy. As regards 
monetary policy, institutional analysis focuses on the independence of the 
central bank in relation to other political actors, as noted above. In line with 
this, most interaction analyses examine the interplay of bargaining and 
central bank independence. However, this is not the most appropriate 
approach, as far as our problem is concerned. In this context, the question 
of whether the hypothesized positive association between central bank 
independence and price stability holds is of secondary importance. What 
actually interests us, is the responsiveness of alternative wage setting 
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institutions to monetary policy as such, regardlss of how this policy relates 
to central bank independence. Hence, it is preferable to capture differences 
in monetary policy as such, namely differences in its restrictiveness, all the 
more since a standard measure of central bank independence is not 
available (Iversen, 2000). The empirical findings on the interaction between 
monetary policy and the bargaining institutions (operationalized in terms of 
horizontal and vertical coordination) are documented in Traxler et al., 
(2001). Hence, we again refrain from going into technical details of this 
analysis which is based on data for 20 OECD countries from 1970 to 1996. 
Monetary policy is operationalized as growth rates of monetary supply of 
M1. The main results of this analysis, as far as voluntary forms of wage 
setting are concerned, are summarized in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
The Interaction Between the Bargaining Institutions and the Monetary Regime 
 
Bargaining  
institutions 
The conditional effect of monetary policy caused by a shift from 
accommodation to non-accommodation 
 Labour costs+ Inflation Change in 
unemployment 
Uncoordinated bargaining Insignificant Insignificant Significantly 
increasing* 
Pattern bargaining Significantly 
dampening** 
Significantly 
dampening** 
Insignificant 
Peak-level coordination, 
high governability 
Significantly 
dampening* 
Significantly 
dampening** 
Significantly 
dampening** 
Peak-level coordination, 
low governability 
Significantly 
dampening** 
Significantly 
dampening** 
Insignificant 
* p £ 0.05 ** p £ 0.001 
+ Increase of unit labour costs 
Source: Traxler et al. (2001: 270). 
 
Most importantly, there is only one category of wage bargaining 
which is not responsive to differences in monetary policy: uncoordinated 
bargaining. In contrast to this, any form of voluntary coordination of 
bargaining is sensitive to monetary policy in the way one should expect: 
that is, a significantly dampening effect of a non- cc mmodating monetary 
policy on labor costs. This dampening effect also applies to peak-level 
coordination under low governability which records the lowest structural 
capacity for internalizing externalities. This indicates that a non-
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accommodating monetary policy can indeed work as a substitute for a lack 
of effective vertical cooperation. Although this tends to increase 
unemployment, this effect remains insignificant by conventional standards 
according to the econometric analysis (Traxler et al., 2001). The shift from 
an accommodating to a non-accommodating monetary policy thus causes 
significant real costs (in terms of rising unemployment) only in a situation of 
uncoordinated bargaining. Under these circumstances, given peak-level 
coordination backed by high governability, such a change in the monetary 
regime even combines with real benefits in the form of a decline in 
unemployment. 
These findings plausibly suggest that the main divide in terms of 
responsiveness to monetary policy is between coordinated and 
uncoordinated wage bargaining. The explanation for this observation lies in 
the fact that any kind of attempt at horizontal (i.e. economy-wide) 
coordination is of macroeconomic relevance, such that the bargainers 
involved have to take account of the responses of monetary authorities to 
their bargaining outcomes. Conversely, the monetary authorities can 
deliberately target the bargainers and influence their behaviour even in 
advance of wage accords, by means of signalling the monetary 
consequences of a certain wage agreement. Put otherwise, coordinated 
bargaining enables the actors to embark on concertation of wage policy 
and monetary policy. The real benefits arising from the coincidence of a 
non-accommodating monetary policy and highly governable peak-level 
coordination indicate that this combination can most effectively make use of 
concertation. A possible explanation for this is that peak-lev l coordination 
is better prepared than pattern bargaining to comprehensively concert all 
relevant, interdependent policy fields, such that the benefits of price 
stability and wage moderation can more effectively translated into positive 
employment effects. The Dutch ‘miracle’ (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997) is 
probably the most obvious example of such successful setting. This kind of 
intentional interaction between wage policy and monetary policy is 
impossible in the case of uncoordinated bargaining. On the o e and, it is 
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not rational for the bargainers to internalize monetary policy effects 
because none of the numerous bargaining units is so comprehensive that it 
exerts a notable macroeconomic impact. On the other hand, the monetary 
authorities cannot deliberately address the bargainers due to the 
fragmentation of the bargaining process. As a consequence, a wage policy 
which is regarded as inflationary by the monetary authorities can be 
disciplined only ex post in that growing unemployment that ensues from the 
move to monetary nonaccommodation restricts the scope for further wage 
increases. This explains the observed increase in unemployment in the 
wake of a shift to monetary nonaccommodation that coincides with 
uncoordinated bargaining (Table 3). 
These findings also help explain why there has been a 
convergence of labor cost growth across Europe despite the significant 
differences of the national bargaining systems in their structural capacity for 
internalizing wage externalities (Table 2). One important determinant of this 
convergence has been the general shift to nonaccommodation which has 
been able to have such a notable impact on wage movements, since 
virtually all European countries have sought to coordinate their wage policy 
(Table 1). As Table 1 also shows, these efforts have often taken the form of 
tripartite, state-sponsored coordination which –often captured as ‘social 
pacts’ in the literature (e.g. Fajertag and Pochet, 1997)– have explicitly 
aimed at improving one country’s competitiveness by lowering comparative 
labor costs. As a result, wage setting has converged towards dec easing 
growth rates of pay to an extent that real wages have remained far behind 
productivity growth in Europe (Schulten and Stueckler, 2000; Schulten, 
2001). Hence, the coexistence of national fragmentation of bargaining and 
economic integration has created a risk of deflationary wage bargaining 
rather than inflationary wage policies. 
Transnational coordination of bargaining, initiated by the unions, is 
a means of overcoming this risk. As delineated above, however, this project 
is still in its infancy, such it is too early to empirically examine its 
performance. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The above findings on the development of bargaining suggest that 
europesssimist prospects for disorganization as well as eurooptimist 
scenarios of Europeanization do not hold. Coordinated bargaining still 
prevails in Europe, as it has adjusted itself to the changed economic 
circumstances. There is no reason to expect EMU to cause lagged 
disorganization in the future, since coordinated bargaining has survived 
despite extremely unfavorable economic conditions, as compared to the 
wider OECD. There is evidence that coordinated bargaining systems in the 
EU have had to stand much more restrictive macroeconomic demand 
policies than their uncoordinated counterparts which all –but the UK– are 
located outside Europe (Soskice, 2000). As Soskice (2000: 69ff) argues, an 
especially deflationary macroeconomic policy mix has been imposed on 
continental Western Europe as a consequence of the circumstances of 
economic integration, namely the hegemony of the Bundesbank throughout 
the area covered by the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and the 
Maastricht criteria for accession to the EMU. The stability pact has 
reinforced this policy orientation in the eurozone. 
The coincidence of persistent attempts at economy-wide 
coordination and organized decentralization indicates that the national 
bargaining systems have adapted themselves to these economic pressures 
in line with their constituent structures. This is path-dependent development 
which is based on symbiotic relationships between the actors and the 
established structures, implying high costs of radical change (North, 1990). 
Comparative analysis has shown that there are two key structures that 
buttress the organized route of adjustments. Across the OECD, 
coordinated bargaining significantly clusters with the predominance of 
multi-employer bargaining and elaborate participation of organized 
business and labor in public policy-making (Traxler et al., 2001, Traxler, 
2001). Both structural properties make the parties to collective bargaining 
so much relevant in macroeconomic terms that there is a strong incentive 
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for all actors, including the state, to cooperate and concert their policies. An 
organized approach to decentralization is most suitable under these 
circumstances, as this promises to reconcile the requirements for 
coordination and flexibility. This contrasts with the situation in countries 
(e.g. the USA, the UK and New Zealand) where single-employer bargaining 
prevails and the role of organized business and labor is rather negligible. 
The scope of each single-employer settlement is far from exerting a 
noticeable macroeconomic impact. Due to this fragmentation there is no 
need to incorporate the bargaining parties in public policy-making. In all 
these countries one finds progressive disorganization of industrial relations. 
As regards the EU, only the UK matches the disorganized scenario, while 
the conditions in all eurozone countries work in favor of organized path 
dependency. 
This power of organized path dependency also accounts for the 
rise of transnational coordination of bargaining. Neither the social nor the 
macroeconomic dialogue had been established without unions having their 
grip on the labor market by means of multi-employer bargaining across 
Europe. This also questions the pessimist perspective on Europeanization, 
as far as Europeanization is seen as contingent on the emergence of 
genuinely supranational institutions. This perspective is right, when arguing 
that centralized, ‘euro-c rporatist’ collective bargaining is not feasible (e.g. 
Marsden, 1992). However, decentralized mechanisms are sufficient for 
effective coordination, as the crossnational comparison has shown. In the 
case of the eurozone, establishing such a decentralized framework for 
transnational coordination creates less difficulties than building centralized 
pan-European institutions. Above all, it is only a decentralized framework 
for coordination which can be compatible with the continued diversity of the 
national bargaining institutions. In fact, the way in which bargaining has 
become ‘Europeanized’ so far exactly follows the decentralized route to 
coordination. 
Nevertheless, the future of this spill-over of coordination to the 
European level is still dubious. This is not only because the employers are 
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not interested in this undertaking. Even more essentially, the relationship 
between national and transnational bargaining is highly ambivalent. In 
structural terms, national coordination is conducive to transnational 
coordination, because transnational coordination cannot work without 
corresponding institutions and practices within the member states. Yet in 
terms of policy goals, national and transnational coordination conflict with 
each other, since the former has been committed to competitive wage 
policies, something which the latter intends to overcome. Since wages are 
still set within the national boundaries, transnational coordination may be 
reduced to symbolic politics at worst, when it will continuously be crowded 
out by coordination bound to national interests. 
At any rate, there is overwhelming evidence of institutional 
continuity of bargaining in the eurozone which in turn means lasting 
diversity across the national bargaining systems. There is far less clear 
evidence regarding the performance effects of this development, although 
mainstream reasoning stresses the propensity for inflationary wage policies 
under these circumstances. The standard argument is that any kind of 
national bargaining represents a case of intermediate centralization in the 
eurozone. Intermediate systems are too small to significantly influence the 
macroeconomic development, implying that they do not bear the full burden 
of the negative macroeconomic consequences of their pay hikes (e.g. 
Henley and Tsakalatos, 1992; Peters, 1995). One finds this argument most 
pronounced in accounts committed to the hump-shape hypothesis 
according to which intermediate systems perform worst, as outlinedabove. 
Since complete centralization of bargaining is regarded as unfeasible, the 
demand for decentralizing bargaining to the company level has been put 
forward mainly by the neoliberal economic policy community (Crouch, 
2000). This program for bargaining  the eurozone is misleading for 
several reasons. Due to the path dependency of bargaining complete 
decentralization is as unfeasible in Europe as centralization is. 
Furthermore, the above analysis has shown that intermediate systems 
perform well, provide  their bargaining rounds are coordinated. Last but not 
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least, the neoliberal program even fails to grasp a key point underlying the 
hump-shape hypothesis. Accordingly, the performance of intermediate 
bargaining is particularly poor due to the cartel-like ffect that results from 
the fact that the products covered by a sector-l vel collective agreement 
are more substitutable for each other than they are for products outside the 
agreement’s scope (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988: 31-39). This does not 
match the situation of the national economies within the single market 
which have been recording a high and still growing mutual trade 
penetration. 
There is another scenario which traces the tendency towards 
inflationary wage policies in the eurozone to changes in the incentive 
structure of the bargainers in Germany (Soskice and Iversen, 1998). 
Accordingly, EMU as such has not significantly changed the bargaining 
conditions in the eurozone countries except for Germany, since there was 
only one ‘single real bank (i.e. the Bundesbank due to its monetary 
hegemony) in Europe even before EMU. Yet EMU has substantially 
changed the German situation, since the Bundesbank, when consistently 
pursuing its nonaccommodating monetary policy, could directly target the 
national bargainers, in particular the pattern-setting metal industry. As the 
ECB will not directly address the German bargainers, they become relieved 
of the disciplining pressures of monetary nonaccommodation. 
The problem with this argument is that it does not systematically 
consider the fact that the national economies interact with monetary policy 
also in areas other than wage formation. Empirical evidence suggests that 
the German economy is especially sensitive to European monetary policy 
due to certain structural properties (Baumgartner and Url, 1999). This 
generally high sensitivity of the German economy is likely to keep also its 
bargainers responsive to monetary policy, even though direct control, as 
exerted by the Bundesbank, has disappeared. Another reason for 
continued efforts to moderate wages emanates from the fact that Germany 
is especially vulnerable to economic developments outside the eurozone as 
a result of being one of the eurozone’s main manufacturing exporters 
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(Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2001). Most essentially, pattern-setting (as is 
established in Germany) performs very well, regardless of what kind of 
monetary regime is given (Table 2). In line with this, real wages grew less 
in Germany than on average in the EU during the last years (Arrowsmith 
and Sisson, 2001; Bahnmüller, 2001). As Germany’s bargainers will thus 
hardly change their behavior and the bargainers of the other eurozone 
countries operated under conditions similar to EMU even before the 
introduction of the single currency, one may assume that EMU will not 
significantly change the context and performance of the bargaining 
systems.  
This assumption complements the above findings on the path 
dependency of bargaining, especially those on the continuity of 
coordination which is most important to performance. However, one has to 
specify this assumption, since the labor cost effects of alternative 
bargaining systems somewhat differ, depending on whether analysis only 
controls for monetary policy (Table 2) or examines its interaction with 
bargaining (Table 3). Although wage setting is coordinated in all eurozone 
countries, the incoherence of the structural capacity for internalizing wage 
externalities is enormous in that almost all countries belonged to either of 
the two extreme groups of very well or very poorly performing categories of 
coordination during the late 1990s (Table 1). This is mainly due to deeply 
entrenched differences in governability. Hence, the eurozone has not 
become more coherent since that time. Despite this incoherence there has 
been a clear convergence towards declining labor cost growth for more 
than a decade for two main reasons (Traxler et al., 2001): the shift to 
monetary nonaccommodation and the extraordinary national efforts to cope 
with the single market and to meet the Maastricht criteria. None of these 
factors will last. As outlined above, the ECB is unable to target each of the 
national bargaining systems. After accession to the eurozone the relevant 
interest groups which have so much strived to achieve this goal (Pochet,
1999) will hardly accept further sacrifices for the sake of EMU. As monetary 
policy cannot vary across countries in the eurozone, Table 2 indicates the 
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performance of alternative bargaining institutions under EMU more 
appropriately than Table 3 does. This means that, ceteris paribus, wage 
movements across Europe may diverge rather than converge in the future. 
Aside from growing trade penetration in the eurozone, there are 
two institutional factors that might countervail these tendencies towards 
divergence. At national level growing divergence of wage movements may 
prompt government responses in those countries recording poor 
performance. In this case, the path-dependent (and thus most probable) 
response is state-imposed coordination. At European level, transnational 
bargaining coordination may consolidate. What appears to emerge in 
response to the coordination initiatives mentioned above, is a special kind 
of transnational pattern bargaining, with Germany as the gravity center and 
the core countries of the former Deutschmarkzone as the other 
participants. 
While state-imposed coordination may dam up inflationary 
tendencies, it threatens to fuel deflationary wage rounds. Effective 
transnational bargaining coordination would be best prepared to avoid 
inflationary as well as deflationary wage policies. 
Although setting up transnational coordination procedures is less 
difficult than building a centralized pan-European bargaining system, its 
effectiveness is uncertain under the given circumstances. As we have 
seen, the effectiveness of coordination depends on the ability to overcome 
the horizontal as well as the vertical problem of cooperation. The main 
problem in the eurozone is that more than half of its countries lack 
bargaining governability needed to cope with the vertical cooperation 
problem. Since the vertical cooperation problems aggravate with bargaining 
centralization, high governability is even more needed for transnational 
coordination than for its national counterpart, as the former represents a 
more centralized mode of coordination than the latter. It is thus no 
exaggeration to say that bargaining governability is the Achilles heel of 
transnational coordination. 
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Regardless of this, transnational coordination is feasible in the 
eurozone, since it is the ess nce of pattern bargaining that its effectiveness 
does not hinge on an encompassing and complete accord among all the 
bargaining units of the overall system. What is actually needed is a critical 
mass capable of setting the pace, while the other bargaining units simply 
follow. In all the OECD countries recording a long tradition of pattern 
bargaining (i.e. Japan, Germany and Austria) the critical mass of the 
pattern setter (i.e. the metal industry) represents less than 15 per cent of 
the total number of employees (Traxler et al., 2001). Put otherwise, the 
effect of pattern bargaining clearly transcends the formal scope of the 
initiating bargaining unit. Likewise, complete participation of all national 
bargaining systems across the eurozone is not needed for coordination in 
the context of EMU. In the case of EMU the critical mass for effective 
coordination across the eurozone would be reached if the coordination 
process covers a range of bargaining units which are so economically 
important that their coordinated policies secure the achievement of 
macroeconomic goals in the eurozone. 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. One finds less pronounced resistence among employers in a few sectors like 
construction and road haulage, where incoming workers from low-standard 
countries outside the EU tend to distort inter-firm competition (Marginson and 
Sisson, 2001).  
 
2. For instance, one standard assumption is that there exists only one single (i.e. 
monopoly) union per country. 
 
3. Such a scaling becomes possible only by means of ranking the dis inct 
coordination modes according to their comparative performance. Such an 
approach, however, results in tautology when using this measure as a 
predictor of performance. 
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